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BANKING CRISIS
MANAGEMENT IN
THE EU: AN INTERIM
ASSESSMENT
JEAN PISANI-FERRY AND ANDRÉ SAPIR
Highlights
• The European Union was institutionally ill-prepared to
manage the 2007-2008 financial crisis, with an inadequate
architecture for resolving problems within the European
single financial market.
• Throughout the period 2007-2009 the situation in the EU
has been characterised by a lingering lack of transparency,
not only vis-à-vis market participants and the public, but
also among policy-making institutions.
• Management of coordination has been ad hoc, but,
remarkably, it has not been impeded by the divide between
the euro area, and the main financial centre of London.
• Crisis management has mostly taken place according to the
assignment of competences in the EU: the European  Central
Bank and national central banks have provided liquidity in
their respective jurisdictions, national governments have
stepped in to ensure financial stability, and the European
Commission has enforced competition disciplines. 
• So far, policy performance has been better than expected
given the sub-optimal nature of EU financial institutional
arrangements.
This paper is a preliminary draft prepared for and presented at
the Economic Policy Panel in October 2009.
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Introduction 
It would certainly not be an overstatement to say that the European Union (EU) was 
institutionally ill-prepared to manage a financial crisis, especially one involving systemic cross-
border institutions. Well before the 2007/2008 crisis, many authors, both from academia and 
policy circles, warned that the architecture for resolving problems within the European single 
financial market was deficient.  
There were worries about the ability to manage either liquidity or solvency difficulties. On the 
liquidity side, concern focused on the absence of clear guidelines for implementing the EU 
lender-of-last-resort function in situations when pan-European banks would experience 
problems (see, in particular, Prati and Schinasi, 1998 and 1999, Schinasi and Teixeira, 2006 and 
Nieto and Schinasi, 2007). On the solvency side, there was equal concern about the lack of clear 
arrangements for the resolution of cross-border banking crises, in particular fiscal burden-
sharing mechanisms (see, in particular, Goodhart, 2004, Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2006, 
Mayes, Nieto and Wall, 2007, and Nieto and Schinasi, 2007).
2 Even Alexandre Lamfalussy, the 
former managing director of the Bank of International Settlement and former president of the 
European Monetary Institute, deemed existing European arrangements “suboptimal” 
(Lamfalussy, 2004).    
Against this background, this paper assesses the actual response of EU and national authorities 
to the financial crisis. Our main finding is that, so far, their policy performance has been better 
than may have been expected prior to the crisis, but only because institutional arrangements 
were so sub-optimal.    
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 describes the pre-crisis EU banking landscape in 
terms of both market integration and crisis management arrangements. Section 2 describes the 
main banking events and the policy responses since the start of the crisis. Section 3 presents our 
assessment of the management of the crisis using first the pre-crisis institutional arrangements 
and then the EU arrangements deemed desirable by the literature as benchmarks. Section 4 
concludes with a discussion of policy lessons and the choices ahead.    
                                                            
2 Interestingly nearly all the researchers in this area are (or were at one point) affiliated with public institutions in 
charge of managing financial problems. Goodhart is a former official at the Bank of England, Mayes is with the Bank 
of Finland, Nieto with the Bank of Spain, Prati and Schinasi with the International Monetary Fund, Schoenmaker 
was an official at the Dutch Ministry of Finance, Teixeira is with the European Central Bank and Wall with the 
Federal Bank of Atlanta.    3 
 
1. The pre-crisis EU banking landscape 
Financial and specifically banking integration has been regarded by EU policymakers as a goal in 
itself since the early days of the single European market. The cross-border provision of financial 
services was envisaged very much in the same way as the provision of any other service, and 
emphasis was put on the efficiency gains a more integrated market would provide. This meant 
relying on the home country principle that allowed a financial institution legally established in 
any member state to provide banking services cross-border. 
The single market for banking was slow to take-off and the pure cross-border provision of 
consumer-oriented services proved to be an illusion – largely because tax and regulatory 
differences make financial products differ across countries. What remained of the single market 
was the predominance of the home country principle. Banks are supervised by the authorities of 
the countries were they are headquartered, and only the fiscal authorities of that country are in 
a position to bail them out.     
1.1 The internationalisation of the EU banking sector 
European banking witnessed important changes after the liberalisation of capital movements in 
the early 1990s, the introduction of the euro in 1999 and the enlargements to the new member 
states (NMS) in 2004 and 2007. 
The creation of a single market for financial services and the introduction of the single currency 
produced conditions for greater consolidation and internationalisation in EU banking. Kleimeier 
and Sandler (2007) summarise the main evidence found in the existing literature, while the ECB 
(2006 and 2008) and the European Commission (2006 and 2007) provide additional information: 
•  There was extensive mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity. Most of it was between 
domestic institutions, but cross-border mergers also gained momentum. In 2004, for 
instance, cross-border mergers accounted for less than 25 percent of the total number 
of bank mergers within the EU-25 but reflected approximately 80 percent of the total 
value of deals (European Commission, 2006). 
•  Schoenmaker and van Laecke (2007) calculate a transnationality index (TI) for banking, 
based on UNCTAD’s measure of internationalisation which uses three indicators: assets 
(loans and securities), revenues and employment. Based on the achieved TI scores the 
authors classify banks as domestic, regional or global. Comparing the situation of the top 
30 European banking groups in 2000 and in 2005, they find that the number of 
predominantly domestic and global banks decreased, respectively, from 18 to 15 and 
from 5 to 3. By contrast, the number of predominantly regional groups increased from 7 
to 11, with the total number of European groups having dropped by one unit due to a 4 
 
merger. They conclude that “the long expected cross-border merger wave in Europe has 
started. European banking is finally arriving” (Schoenmaker and van Laecke, 2007, p. 61). 
•  The European Commission (2007) finds that, indeed, one the new features of the 
European financial landscape was the emergence of major pan-European financial 
institutions and groups. Moreover, the ECB (2006) identified 46 systemically important 
banking groups that accounted for 68% of EU banking assets, of which about half with 
significant cross-border activity.  
•  The national presence of foreign banks, measured by their asset share in domestic 
markets, varies a great deal across EU member states. In 2004, it was less than 10 
percent in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, but more than 90 percent in the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Slovakia. In general, foreign 
presence is much larger in the new member states than in the old ones. According to 
ECB (2008), in 2007, foreign entities in the NMS accounted for 70 percent of total 
banking assets, while the corresponding figure for the EU-15 was slightly below 30 
percent. 
•  Persson (2007) calculates a cross-border banking index defined as the sum of the share 
of domestic banks’ total assets held in EU-25 countries outside the home country and 
the foreign banks’ share of the domestic bank market. In 2005, EU member states fell 
into four categories: those with an index of more than 75 percent (the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia), those with an index between 50 and 75 percent (the 
three Benelux countries, the three Scandinavian countries, Cyprus, Italia, Lithuania and 
Poland), those with an index between 25 and 50 percent (Austria, Germany, Ireland, 
Latvia, Malta, Portugal, Spain and the UK) and those with an index of less than 25 
percent (France, Greece and Slovenia). 
•  Véron (2007) and Posen and Véron (2009) contrast the situation in Europe with those of 
other continents. European banks are significantly more internationalised than banks in 
the US, Japan or China and this primarily results from their internationalisation within 
Europe (Figure 1). 
To sum up, prior to the crisis the European banking sector was undergoing a process of market 
integration. The process was slower than expected by the architects of the single market but it 
was undoubtedly taking place.   
1.2 Crisis prevention: the supervisory system 
With the slow but steady advance of banking integration, Europe was being confronted to what 
Schoenmaker and Oosterloo (2007) have called the trilemma of financial supervision: like for 
the famous Mundell trilemma, there is an inherent incompatibility between integration, 
financial stability and independent national supervision. Furthermore, there was – and still is – a 5 
 
fundamental tension in the EU between home country responsibility for the supervision of 
financial institutions and host country responsibility for financial stability. The home country 
supervisors’ mandate does not include co-responsibility for financial stability in partner 
countries but the host country authorities, whose mandate is to ensure financial stability, do not 
have authority for supervising financial institutions from partner countries unless they operate 
through subsidiaries.   
These problems were recognised early on but there was no will to address them in a radical way 
as was done for the Mundell trilemma with the creation of the euro. No competence was 
transferred to the EU level as was done in 1999 for monetary policy. Instead, the emphasis was 
put on two main principles, decentralisation and cooperation, with the hope that coordination 
within specialised committees and procedures for information exchange would, temporarily, 
address the deficiencies of the system.   
Specifically, cooperation was strengthened in three areas. First, the prudential framework 
followed by national supervisors was largely harmonised by EU legislation. Second, a Committee 
of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) was established in 2003, but its role is limited to 
facilitating consultation among supervisors and to providing technical advice to the European 
Commission on regulation and convergence of supervisory practices. Third, provisions were 
made for cooperation in time of crisis (see infra).  
Reasons for rejecting a reform of supervisory arrangements were several. The strongest 
argument was that since most banks were mostly national, there was an informational 
advantage in keeping supervision at national level. However this argument was only valid as 
long as it corresponded to reality. But when merger and acquisitions led to the emergence of 
pan-European banks supervisory arrangements did not keep pace. National responsibility for 
financial stability was even used as a pretext to deter the acquisition of national champions by 
foreign banks, as famously illustrated by governor Fazio’s stance on foreign investment in Italy.    
1.2 The architecture for crisis management 
The main responsibility for financial stability and crisis management in the European Union lies 
with national banking supervisory bodies, central banks, treasuries and deposit insurance 
schemes. However, a number of EU bodies and procedures exist that provide some degree of 
harmonisation between national rules and cooperation between national authorities.   
Lender-of-last resort 
The provision of liquidity assistance to banks in the EU is the responsibility of national central 
banks. In the case of cross-border banking institutions, it is the central bank of the host country 
which bears the responsibility, regardless of whether the foreign bank operates as a branch or 6 
 
as a subsidiary on its territory. Since banking supervision is also national, with the main 
responsibility for cross-border institutions assigned to the home country, there is a distinct risk 
of insufficient flow of information and too little cooperation between in case of market stress.  
The situation is similar in the euro area, where the European Central Bank (ECB) has not been 
formally assigned lender-of-last-resort responsibility by the Maastricht treaty. Liquidity 
assistance is decentralised. Furthermore the ECB has no supervisory authority, nor privileged 
access to information from national supervisors.  
There are, however, two caveats to this. First, mechanisms have been in place since 1999 to 
ensure an adequate flow of information within the Eurosystem in case a national central bank 
takes the decision to provide emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to an institution operating 
within its jurisdiction. The purpose is to ensure that the provision of ELA is consistent with the 
maintenance of the appropriate single monetary stance (ECB, 2000). Second, although the ECB 
is not the lender-of-last-resort in charge of providing liquidity to individual banks, it is, at least 
implicitly, responsible for providing liquidity to the euro area system as a whole, since no other 
institution is capable of assuming such task (Walter and Bergheim, 2008).  
Cooperation within the EU concerns the exchange of information in crisis situations. Here 
cooperation is based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of March 2003 on high-level 
principles of cooperation between the banking supervisors and central banks of the EU in crisis 
management situations. The text of the MoU has not been made public. According to the press 
release, it consists of a set of principles and procedures for cross-border cooperation that deal 
specifically with the identification of the authorities responsible for crisis management, the 
required flows of information between all the involved authorities and the practical conditions 
for sharing information at the cross-border level. The MoU also provides for the setting-up of a 
logistical infrastructure to support the enhanced cross-border cooperation between 
authorities.
3  
Crisis resolution 
When solvency becomes an issue, responsibility for crisis resolution shifts from central banks to 
treasuries. Since there is no EU or even euro area treasury or common pool of resources 
available for this purpose, crisis resolution is entirely the responsibility of national treasuries 
and there are no specific provision for crisis resolution affecting pan-European banks.      
Cooperation among treasuries and between treasuries and central banks takes place at the level 
of ministers and central bank governors through the ECOFIN Council. The decisions of the 
ECOFIN in all matters, including crisis management, are prepared by the Economic and Financial 
                                                            
3 See press release at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2003/html/pr030310_3.en.html. 7 
 
Committee (EFC), which comprises of deputy finance ministers and deputy central bank 
governors.    
The only ex ante crisis management arrangement that existed at the EU level prior to the crisis 
was a MoU of May 2005 on cooperation between the banking supervisors, central banks and 
finance ministries of the European Union in financial crisis situations. Like the previous one, the 
text of this MoU has not been made public. According to the press release, it consists of a set of 
principles and procedures that deal specifically with the sharing of information, views and 
assessments among the authorities potentially involved in a crisis situation, the appropriate 
procedures for such sharing of information and the conditions for cooperation and information 
flow at the national and cross-border level. In order to further support the enhanced cross-
border cooperation between authorities, the MoU also includes arrangements for the 
development, at the national and EU level, of contingency plans for the management of crisis 
situations, along with stress-testing and simulation exercises.
4 The MoU is explicitly non-legally 
binding. In particular, it contains no ex ante burden-sharing arrangement between national 
treasuries.  
Deposit guarantee schemes 
Within the EU, deposit guarantee schemes are purely national and have largely developed in 
independent ways across member states. Depositors are ensured according to rules in force in 
the country where the bank is headquartered, which implies that customers in any given market 
do not benefit from the same guarantee.  
In 1994, however, the EU adopted Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes that 
provided a harmonised minimum level of deposit protection throughout the EU. Such 
protection was to be achieved by requiring every credit institution to join a DGS and by having 
each DGS guarantee any depositor up to an amount of the minimum EU level which was set at 
€20,000. This amount remained unchanged until the crisis. 
The main problem with the directive is that it fails to address the increasing cross-border activity 
within the EU single banking market. As noted by Persson (2007), “most schemes are only able 
to finance the problem if it is confined to minor banks and governments would have to 
intervene for larger systemic problems. No DGS is adapted to address a troubled institution in 
any of the major cross-border groups.” 
                                                            
4 See press release at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2005/html/pr050518_1.en.html. 8 
 
1.3 Conclusion  
Two conclusions emerge from the previous discussion. First, the years before the 2007/2008 
crisis witnessed a rapid internationalisation of the EU banking sector, with the development of 
large cross-border groups. Second, although the EU’s institutional architecture for financial crisis 
management was nominally based on both decentralisation and cooperation, the latter clearly 
relied on weak procedures if not mere declarations of intent. As summarised in Table 1, actual 
competence essentially rested with national authorities.  
As already stated, the deficiencies of the system were well identified prior to the crisis. 
Frustration with the lack of progress was also clearly expressed in the literature and at policy 
conferences. For instance, Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2007) had “identified a number of issues and 
concerns about the present system design that are likely to result in higher than necessary costs 
of insolvencies in cross-border banking. To date, little progress appears to have been made in 
the EU in dealing with them. Indeed, as both cross-border branches and subsidiaries increase in 
importance in host EU countries, the resulting potential dangers of the current structure are 
likely to become large and may not only reduce aggregate welfare in the affected countries 
substantially when foreign banks with domestic branches or subsidiaries approach insolvency, 
but also threaten financial stability. Serious doubts are cast about the longer-term viability of 
the single passport concept for cross-border branch banking under the existing institutional 
environment” (Eisenbeis and Kaufman, 2007, p. 43). 
The deficiencies of the system had also become known to the EFC, which in April 2006 ran a 
simulation exercise which took place at the ECB premises and involved the participation of 
banking supervisors, central banks and finance ministries from all EU-25 countries. The 
simulation clearly pointed to basic problems in cooperation for managing cross-border crises, a 
situation which prompted the ECOFIN to set up a special working group on crisis management 
under the auspices of the EFC.  
The reason for this clearly suboptimal situation is that EU policy had been to put market 
integration first and to build policy integration only as a response to market integration. This 
strategy had been implemented with success in other fields and it was essentially replicated: the 
logic was to enlist market forces at the service of the integration process and to proceed with 
the next step of policy integration when rendered necessary by the advance of market 
integration and supported by participants in it.  
2. The management of the crisis 
So far, the crisis has gone through two phases. The first phase, starting in August 2007, started 
with a general liquidity strain affecting all EU countries (and nearly all other industrial countries) 
and gradually morphed into a crisis of securitisation and leverage. Tensions on money markets 9 
 
as measured by the EURIBOR-OIS spread had ups and downs during this phase but remained 
consistently above pre-crisis levels (Figure 2). There were also some solvency problems affecting 
specific institutions, but none of them with (significant) cross-border activities. The second 
phase, which started in September 2008 and could be considered over by summer 2009, 
witnessed both a general loss of confidence and institution-specific solvency crises affecting 
some major cross-border banks
5. The EURIBOR-OIS spread jumped markedly in September 2008 
and abated only gradually.  
2.1 The first phase of the crisis: from August 2007 to August 2008 
The first sign of a financial crisis appeared in August 2007 in the EU, when BNP Paribas froze 
redemption for three investment funds, citing its inability to value structured products due to 
the rise of delinquencies on US subprime mortgages. As a result, counterparty risk between 
banks increased sharply and liquidity evaporated from the interbank market, forcing central 
banks to provide massive liquidity to their banking systems. In the euro area, this general 
liquidity crisis was handled, as foreseen in the literature on financial stability (Goodhart, 2000 
and Schoenmaker, 2003), by the ECB, without the need of detailed supervisory information on 
individual institutions.  
Unlike the Federal Reserve, which had to introduce new facilities to provide liquidity to financial 
institutions, the ECB was able to perform this role without significant reform of its procedures 
and operational framework (ECB, 2009). The range of collaterals it was able to accept in repo 
lending was already very wide because it has been set on the basis of existing practices in euro 
area countries. The diversity of these practices resulted in giving considerable flexibility to the 
Eurosystem and this proved to be an asset. The ECB therefore essentially fine-tuned the 
provision of liquidity to the banking sector.
6 In December 2007, it also entered into a swap 
agreement with the Federal Reserve and other major central banks in order to be able to 
provide foreign currency liquidity to European banks experiencing difficulty in accessing it on 
the markets.       
Given the propensity of general liquidity crises to turn into solvency crises for weaker 
institutions and given the increased risk that some of these institutions might be cross-border 
ones, it was timely for the EFC ad hoc group to have launched its work the previous year. By 
September 2007, the Economic and Financial Committee was able to issue a report containing 
basic principles for crisis management in the EU.
7  Besides basic principles, the EFC called for a 
common analytical framework for the assessment of crisis situations and for the conclusion of a 
                                                            
5 Chronologies of the crisis abound. See for example FSA (2009).  
6 Through a front-loading of liquidity provision within the monthly maintenance period and the introduction of 
longer-term three-month refinancing operations.  
7  The report (ECFIN/CEFCPE(2007)REP/53990) has not been made public. 10 
 
new MoU between all relevant authorities. Crucially, the EFC report committed all member 
states to view a crisis of a pan-European financial institution as a “matter of common interest”. 
It also specified a number of practical measures to address the deficiencies in the current 
institutional set-up. Writing in March 2008, the Deutsche Bank Chief Economist and a 
collaborator commented that “the EFC report goes as far as is possible under current 
arrangements in trying to ensure that the crisis of a pan-European financial institution will be 
dealt with appropriately. It remains to be seen, though, whether these arrangements will prove 
sufficient – especially since they do not fundamentally change the incentive patterns for the 
authorities in member states” (Walter and Bergheim, 2008, p. 7). 
Based on the EFC report, the ECOFIN Council of October 2007 agreed on common principles 
intended to be the basis for cooperation among national authorities in preserving financial 
stability within the EU. These principles were meant to be respected in the management of any 
cross-border financial crisis with potential systemic implications and to “constitute a consistent 
and sound basis for responding to any financial crisis situations in the EU, specifying the 
overarching considerations for cross-border cooperation, taking into account that quick actions 
may be needed to safeguard financial stability” (Council of the European Union, 2007, p. 23). 
The common principles included the following: 
•  The objective of crisis management is to protect the stability of the financial system in all 
countries involved and in the EU as a whole. It is not to prevent bank failures. 
•  Managing a cross-border crisis is a matter of common interest for all member states 
affected. Where a bank group has significant cross-border activities in different member 
states, authorities in these countries will “carefully cooperate and prepare in normal 
times as much as possible for sharing a potential fiscal burden”. If public resources are 
involved, direct budgetary net costs are shared among affected member states on the 
basis of “equitable and balanced criteria”.  
•  Full participation in management and resolution of a crisis will be ensured at an early 
stage for those member states that may be affected through individual institutions or 
infrastructures, taking into account that quick actions may be needed to solve the crisis. 
•  Policy actions in the context of crisis management must comply with EU competition and 
state-aid rules. 
Once again, however, incentives for member states to cooperate before or during a crisis were 
left untouched. The Commission was invited to propose ways to clarify cooperation obligations 
by end 2008 for adoption by the European Parliament and the Council by the end of 2009. In the 
meantime, member states were simply encouraged to develop and sign specific ‘voluntary 
cooperation agreements’ between relevant national authorities as soon as possible. The only EU 
instrument for crisis management remained competition and state aid rules. 11 
 
During this period, member states intervened with rescue measures aimed at preventing 
insolvency of several banks, none with (substantial) cross-border activities.
8 These state 
measures were handled by the EU competition authority, the European Commission, on the 
basis of the standard rules on rescue and restructuring aid.
9   
In June 2008, a new Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between the banking 
supervisors, central banks and finance ministries of the European Union on cross-border 
financial stability was adopted, updating the MoU of May 2005. The new document 
incorporated the common principles agreed by the October 2007 ECOFIN Council and added 
specific procedures to improve cooperation within and between member states, by making the 
flow of information better and by assigning clearer responsibility for coordination within and 
between countries in the case of a cross-border crisis.
10 The main innovation of the MoU was 
the recommendation that countries with common financial stability concerns stemming from 
the presence of cross-border financial institutions develop voluntary specific cooperation 
agreements (VSCA), including the creation of cross-border stability groups (CBSG) in charge of 
facilitating the management and resolution of cross-border financial crises.
  
Reviewing the MoU, two central bankers responsible for financial stability concluded that the 
crisis has “underlined the need to develop a consistent framework for the management of a 
crisis involving a bank with a cross-border dimension in Europe. The 2008 MoU on cooperation 
on cross-border financial stability not only establishes such a framework, but also clarifies the 
principles underlying this framework. The existence of these principles does not prevent 
authorities to have diverging interests in the management of the crisis. However, it sets up a 
common ground on which future improvements to the European crisis management framework 
can be built” (Praet and Nguyen, 2008, p. 375). 
It is certainly true that the first phase of the crisis generated a great deal of activity within the 
European financial stability community. However, what is even more striking is how little 
progress was achieved in terms of building a European crisis management framework, despite 
the urgency. As a matter of fact the recommendations contained in the October 2007 ECOFIN 
Council conclusions and in the June 2008 MoU were almost similar to those contained in the 
EFC report of April 2001 on financial crisis management, the so-called ‘Brouwer Report’.
11 At the 
heart of both sets of recommendations was the need to improve the cross-border exchange of 
information. Unfortunately neither created incentives or obligations to change the behaviour of 
national authorities, thereby leaving the problem of information exchange unsolved.  
                                                            
8 IKB, Sachsen LB and WestLB in Germany; Northern Rock in the United Kingdom; and Roskilde Bank in Denmark. 
9 Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty (‘R&R Guidelines’). 
10 Contrary to earlier ones, this MoU (ECFIN/CEFCPE(2008)REP/53106 REV) was made public. 
11 EFC/ECFIN/251/01-en-Final. 12 
 
2.2 The second phase of the crisis: since September 2008  
The crisis of confidence among banks dramatically worsened in mid-September 2008 with the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The insolvency of Lehman Brothers not only reduced sharply 
the already deficient liquidity in various markets, but unleashed serious solvency problems of 
several major European banks. On 27 September, the Belgo-Dutch bank Fortis became the first 
systemic EU ban to be rescued by governments. The intervention by the governments of 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands was followed on 30 September by the intervention 
by the governments of Belgium, France and Luxembourg to rescue the Belgo-French bank Dexia, 
another major institution. The same day, the Irish Minister of Finance announced a unilateral 
government decision to guarantee all deposits and debts of six Irish banks and their subsidiaries 
located abroad. This move, which was sharply criticised in other EU countries, was just the 
beginning in terms of national rescue packages with cross-border implications and potential risk 
for the entire EU banking system.  
In view of the systemic nature of the crisis and the response by national governments, it 
became clear that the R&R Guidelines were no more providing an appropriate framework to 
handle state aid to the banking sector. On 4 October 2008 a meeting of the heads of state and 
government of France, Germany, and Italy failed to deliver a meaningful result and at the 
Eurogroup and ECOFIN meetings on 6-7 October, Finance Ministers agreed that the economic 
situation “calls for a coordinated response at the EU level”, but apart from a decision to increase 
guarantees on deposits to a minimum of 50,000 euros, it failed to adopt anything beyond broad 
principles and a declaration of intent that “negative spillover effects should be avoided” 
(Council of the European Union, 2008, p. 1).  
The ECB acted on its side with a change of procedure for refinancing operations. Instead of its 
variable rate tender, which involved both variability in the cost of liquidity and uncertainty 
about the amount available to individual institutions, the move to a fixed rate procedure with 
full allotment was announced on 8 October 2008. With this new procedure, the banks could be 
certain that their bids for liquidity would be satisfied in full at the rate set by the ECB. This 
resulted both in removing uncertainty and in lowering the cost of liquidity (since the central 
bank rate de facto became a ceiling for the EONIA).
12 The same procedure was applied to US 
dollars operations, which developed significantly to reach almost USD 300bn in December 2008. 
Quasi-simultaneously the list of assets eligible as collateral was temporarily expanded (the 
rating threshold was lowered from A- to BBB- and debt instruments denominated in foreign 
currency became eligible). In contrast with the first period, the ECB therefore went much 
                                                            
12 Details of the new procedure are provided by ECB (2009).  13 
 
beyond the fine-tuning of existing procedures and introduced genuinely innovative 
operations.
13       
At the end of the week of 6 October markets throughout the world suffered one of their worst 
days in history, prompting the French Presidency of the European Union to convene the first-
ever meeting of the heads of state or government of the euro area. This emergency summit, 
held in Paris on 12 October, is generally viewed as the turning point in the efforts to bring about 
a concerted European response to the financial crisis.  
The Paris Declaration
14 on ‘A concerted European action plan for the euro area countries’, 
endorsed by all EU countries at the European Council meeting of 15-16 October, provided an 
plan for concerted action. On substance, it was largely inspired by the British plan of 8 October 
2008
15 and included the same ingredients: a commitment to further liquidity provision by the 
central bank; a commitment to the public recapitalisation of banking institutions in need for 
capital; and public guarantees for bank borrowing. It also committed signatories to enhanced 
cooperation.     
The Paris Declaration paved the way for three important Commission documents that provided 
a consistent framework for the rescue and restructuring of EU banks aimed at minimising 
negative spillover effects: 
•  The ‘Banking Communication’ of 13 October 2008 focused mainly on conditions that 
national guarantees covering bank liabilities have to fulfil to be in compliance with EU 
state aid rules.
16 The main purpose of these conditions was to cut the danger of large 
amounts of funds flowing between member states in search for the highest level of 
protection and to avoid massive distortions to competition. The Banking Communication 
was accompanied by ECB recommendations on the pricing of guarantees
17, also with the 
aim of avoiding competition distortions resulting from different pricing practices across 
member states.  
                                                            
13 Further innovations were introduced in June 2009 with the creation of 12-months fixed-rate, full allotment 
refinancing operations.   
14 See http://www.eu2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/accueil/PFUE-10_2008/PFUE-
12.10.2008/sommet_pays_zone_euro_declaration_plan_action_concertee.html.  
15 HM Treasury, “Financial support to the banking industry”, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_100_08.htm.  
16 Communication from the Commission on ‘The application of the State aid rules to measures taken in relation to 
financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis’, OJ C 270, 5.10.2008. 
17 “Recommendations of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank on government guarantees for bank 
debt”, of 20 October 2008, http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/recommendations_on_guaranteesen.pdf.  14 
 
•  The ‘Recapitalisation Communication’ of 5 December 2008 provided the set of 
conditions relative national funds to recapitalise banks in order to ensure adequate 
levels of lending to the economy.
18  
•  Finally, the 'Impaired Assets Communication' of 25 February 2009 provided the 
framework for the clean-up phase of financial institutions' balance sheets by removing 
toxic assets and underperforming loans.
19 
Furthermore, the Commission call of October 2008 to lift the minimum level of deposit 
guarantees was followed on 11 March 2009 by a Directive setting a new minimum level at 
100.000 euros and shortening the maximum payout delay from nine months to twenty working 
days (with a view to shortening it further to ten working days).
20    
In summary, EU authorities moved swiftly during the fourth quarter of 2008 and in 2009 to put 
in place a framework to respond to the crisis.   
Implementation was also swift. During the period from October 2008 to July 2009, the 
Commission approved a total of over three and a half trillion euros of state aid to financial 
institutions, of which one and half trillion had effectively been used. The support measures fall 
under four main headings: capital injections (recapitalisation); guarantees on bank liabilities; 
relief of impaired assets; and liquidity and bank funding support. Table 2 reproduced from 
European Commission (2009) provides the details of both approved and actual state 
interventions for the EU, the euro area and individual member states by type of support 
measure during the period from October 2008 to August 2009. 
The total of all approved measures amounts to nearly 44 percent of GDP for the entire EU, with 
figures ranging from more than 100 percent in Denmark and Ireland to zero in several new 
member states (Figures 3 and 4). In general approved support measures are low in NMS owing 
to both the fact that the banking sector in these countries is largely controlled by foreign banks 
and to the home country principle. By contrast they are high in small EU-15 countries with large 
exposure to the NMS, such as Austria, Belgium, Netherlands and Sweden.      
The total of all effectively used measures amounts to nearly 12 percent of GDP for the entire 
EU. Individual member states fall into five groups: countries with support measures amounting 
to more than 100 percent of their GDP (Ireland), those with measures ranging between 20 and 
30 percent of their GDP (Belgium, the UK, Netherlands and probably Luxembourg), those with 
                                                            
18 Communication from the Commission on ‘The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial 
crisis: limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition’, OJ 
C 10, 15.1.2009. 
19 Communication from the Commission on ‘The treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector’, OJ 
C 72, 26.3.2009. 
20 Directive 2009/14/EC of 11 March 2009 amending Directive 94/19/EC.   15 
 
measures of around 10 percent of their GDP (Sweden, Germany, Austria and Latvia), those with 
measures ranging of around 5 percent of their GDP (Spain, Denmark, France, Portugal, Hungary, 
Slovenia and Greece) and those with (almost) no support measures (Italy, Finland and nine 
NMS). The remark concerning the NMS and the small EU-15 countries with large exposure to 
the NMS applies here as well.  
In terms of category of support measures, guarantees constitute the most important category 
the EU, with a share of more than 50 percent of approved interventions and two-thirds of 
effective ones at the EU level. However there are important differences across member states. 
Concentrating on the five countries with the highest effective measures relative to GDP, one 
observes that Ireland has focused almost exclusively on state guarantees and that the UK has 
used mainly liquidity and bank funding support. In Luxembourg, like in Ireland, guarantees 
played an important role, but so did recapitalisation. By contrast Belgium and Netherlands 
made use of all four types of measures – recapitalisation, guarantees, impaired assets relief and 
bank funding support.      
The conclusion one draws from this is that member states have made extensive use of various 
forms of national support to their banking sector. At the same time, the ability of the 
Commission to rapidly adapt its R&R Guidelines to the peculiarities of the second phase of the 
financial crisis has probably prevented the worst excesses in terms of negative spillovers. So far, 
we have witnessed national banking crises in countries such as Ireland, Belgium, the UK and the 
Netherlands, but no veritable EU banking crisis.   
3. Assessment and key questions  
Having described the existing policy architecture and how the EU responded to the main phases 
of the crisis, we now move to addressing our initial questions: Have the shortcomings identified 
before the crisis hampered effective crisis management? If not, how have problems been 
circumvented? What instruments have policymakers relied on? And, on the whole, how has the 
EU policy system performed in view of its well-known shortcomings and taking as benchmark 
assessments made before the crisis.   
In what follows we start with a discussion of the role of information asymmetries in the 
European context and continue with a discussion of the way the main externalities were 
managed during the crisis: we address in turn liquidity support, deposit guarantees, the support 
to individual banks, and the treatment of pan-European banks. We leave aside the important 
case of the new member states because it is specific and would deserve a lengthy discussion.   16 
 
3.1 Information sharing 
The policymakers’ primary responsibility in a financial crisis is to determine whether and how to 
provide assistance to institutions in distress. This is first and foremost a matter of information 
on the nature of the problem a particular institution and possibly the financial system as a 
whole are facing. As illustrated by the sequence of events in 2007-2008 worldwide, effective 
crisis management requires that authorities in charge have as accurate as possible information 
on (a) whether a particular institution, and the banking system in general, faces liquidity 
shortages or solvency strains, and (b) what would be the systemic implications of the failure of a 
particular institution. For such an assessment, however, publicly available information is both 
insufficient and distorted, as market-based asset valuation is impaired by panic and financial 
institutions end up valuing the same asset differently.  Even in a centralised system the 
information available to policymaker is therefore partial and imperfect at best and decision is a 
judgment call, as illustrated by about-turns in the management of the Northern Rock crisis in 
the UK and of the broker-dealers crisis in the US. But at least there is supposed to be 
information-sharing among policy institutions.   
Throughout the period 2007-2009 the situation in the EU has been characterised by a lingering 
lack of transparency, not only vis-à-vis market participants and the public, but also among policy 
institutions: 
•  Supervisors did not have adequate enough information. According to the De Larosière 
(2009) report, they “did not seem to share their information properly with their 
counterparts in other Member States or with the US”. Furthermore, the report points 
out that “in too many instances supervisors in Member States were not prepared to 
discuss with appropriate frankness and at an early stage the vulnerabilities of financial 
institutions which they supervised. Information flow among supervisors was far from 
being optimal, especially in the build-up phase of the crisis. This has led to an erosion of 
mutual confidence among supervisors”.   
•  From July 2007 on, the ECB had to take real-time decisions of liquidity assistance to 
financial institutions without having any privileged access to the supervisors’ assessment 
of theses institutions’ health. Even vis-à-vis the market, central bank officials more than 
occasionally felt informationally disadvantaged. And in autumn 2009 the ECB did not 
know with any precision whether the withdrawal of exceptional liquidity support would 
involve the risk that some banks would be unable to finance themselves on the market. 
•  Governments planning for or negotiating over the rescue of cross-border banks did not 
have access to the same, comprehensive information set. 
•  Following the success of the US stress test in restoring a degree of comparability across 
major banks in May 2009, European supervisors decided to conduct a similar exercise, 17 
 
while emphasising that their aim was not “to identify individual banks that may need 
recapitalisation, as the assessment of specific institutions' needs for recapitalisation 
remains a responsibility of national authorities”
21. Results from a stress test based on a 
sample of 22 major European was presented to the informal ECOFIN Council in early 
October 2009, but they only included aggregate information. Neither individual 
information nor information by country nor indications on the distribution of outcomes 
was made available
22. Furthermore, the tests were conducted independently by national 
supervisors on the basis of common guidelines and there is no guarantee that they 
ensure a sufficient degree of comparability across countries.        
•  The International Monetary Fund published in April 2009 a simulation-based assessment 
of the potential write-downs of European banks as a consequence of both losses on US-
originated MBS and credit delinquencies on the banks’ loan portfolios (IMF, 2009a). 
However the assessment was challenged by European officials, with the ECB later 
publishing its own assessment, again based on top-down simulations (ECB, 2009). 
Disagreements resulted in a new evaluation by the IMF in September (IMF, 2009b).   
This situation involves significant risks. As indicated, inaccurate information can lead to faulty 
decisions at EU, euro area or national level. Information is also likely to have been used 
strategically: national authorities are likely to have been facing incentives, either not to 
recognise the fragility of some home-based institutions in the hope that massive provision of 
liquidity by the ECB at near-zero interest rate will help rebuild the banks’ capital base, 
effectively using ECB liquidity assistance as a form of hidden subsidy; or they may have faced 
incentives to provide capital and guarantees to healthy institutions in order to help them 
proceed with acquisitions, effectively distorting competition. Lack of information does not allow 
EU authorities to find out whether governments have actually behaved in either of these ways.    
Following the De Larosière report, the planned creation of a European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) in charge of macro-prudential supervision and the reform of the committee structure of 
micro-prudential supervision are an opportunity to revisit the information issue. The questions 
here are twofold: whether the new European System of Financial Supervisors will receive from 
national supervisors relevant information on cross-border institutions, in accordance with the 
recommendations of the De Larosière report; and whether the ESRB will receive the aggregate 
information necessary to assess overall risks to financial stability in the EU.  
On the first question the Commission proposal of September 2009 for the creation of a 
European Banking Authority states that the Authority will have the power to obtain from 
national supervisory authorities “all the necessary information to carry out [its] duties” and that 
                                                            
21 Statement of CEBS of 12 May 2009.  
22 Press release of CEBS of 1st October 2009.  18 
 
it will establish and manage a central database accessible to colleges of supervisors.
23 On the 
second question, the Commission proposal for the establishment of the ESRB states that it 
should have access to all necessary information “while preserving the confidentiality of these 
data”. In case this information would not be made available, the ESRB would even be entrusted 
with the right to “request data directly from national supervisory authorities, national central 
banks or other authorities of Member States”.
24 Implementation of this legislation would be a 
significant step forward in access to information.  
3.2 Liquidity support 
As indicated in Section 1, there was concern among scholars and practitioners that the 
Eurosystem would not be able to provide effective liquidity support in time of crisis. The fear 
was that the absence of a strong, explicit lender of last resort mandate for the ECB, information 
asymmetries between the ECB and the national central banks of the Eurosystem, and the 
resulting coordination problems would hamper swift and sufficient liquidity provision.  
Those fears proved unfounded. As indicated the ECB was in fact the first central bank to act on 
the evidence of a drying-up of liquidity on the interbank market and throughout the crisis there 
has been no evidence of coordination difficulties between the ECB and the national banks 
belonging to the Eurosystem. Furthermore, there has been close coordination with major 
central banks – especially but not only with the Federal Reserve – resulting in the extraordinary 
innovation of liquidity provision in another currency and the acceptance as collateral of assets 
denominated in another currency.  
This achievement is to be compared to prior assessments. Writing in 1999 on the basis of the 
provisions of the treaty and secondary legislation, Prati and Schinasi found that “there [was] 
uncertainty about whether, in the event of a banking crisis across pan-European markets, there 
will be a central provider or coordinator of emergency liquidity” and that it was “unclear how a 
fast-breaking liquidity crisis will be handled”. The ability of European central banks to distribute 
tasks within the Eurosystem in spite of unclear treaty provision and to coordinate across 
currency zones in spite of the absence of any preexisting formal agreement must be considered 
a significant achievement.   
The only caveat – an important, but specific one – concerns the handling of cross-border 
externalities vis-à-vis the new member states. As already indicated we do not address the issue 
in this paper, but it deserves to be mentioned.   
                                                            
23 ‘Proposal for a regulation establishing a European Banking Authority (EBA), COM(2009) 501 final, 23 September 
2009.  
24 ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community macro prudential 
oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board’ COM(2009) 499 final, 23 
September 2009.  19 
 
3.3 Deposit guarantees  
As already mentioned in Section 1, deposit guarantee schemes are national in scope and were 
loosely harmonised as regards levels, payout delays and procedures to ensure the continuity of 
banking services. Lack of coordination in this regard involved two potential spillover effects: 
• Possible deposit flows across countries in search of better guarantees. 
• Possible deposit flows within countries from banks headquartered in countries with 
insufficient or not adequately funded guarantee schemes to banks headquartered in 
countries with better guarantee schemes.  
The Irish government’s unilateral decision on 30 September 2009 to guarantee all deposits to 
the country’s major banks was perfectly legal as EU legislation provided for minimum 
guarantees only. It was nevertheless regarded as unfair and the risk of deposit outflows was 
assessed significant enough to lead other governments to hint at similar responses, which 
resulted in the fast adoption of a new, higher guarantee floor across the EU. As could have been 
expected there was thus a race to the top followed by closer harmonisation at higher level. 
What is interesting here is that there were only three working days between the Irish decision 
and the ECOFIN Council response. The coordination failure was therefore resolved swiftly 
enough to prevent any possible run on the banks in countries with weaker protection.    
3.4  Bank rescue and restructuring 
Prior to the crisis there were no ex ante provisions for the coordination of bank rescue and 
restructuring if one excludes the general competition policy provisions for state aids to 
individual companies, which were not designed for dealing with threats to financial stability. As 
already indicated, financial stability was regarded as a national competence and there was no 
common framework to provide even loose guidance to government action. There were 
therefore two significant risks: 
•  First, that insufficient or uncoordinated national action would compound financial 
instability. Disparate, unsynchronised introduction of guarantee or rescue schemes 
would have created uncertainty and confusion in time of panic and would have most 
certainly aggravated it. Market reactions to failed coordination attempts like the mini-
summit meeting between France, Germany and Italy on 4 October 2008 suggest this was 
a real threat. 
•  Second, that legitimate national action to safeguard stability would result in a rush to 
subsidy leading to major competitive distortions and a possible fragmentation of the 
Single Market.  20 
 
As the EU had no legal power to foster a coordinated response, its definition and the Member 
States’ commitment to implement it were entirely an exercise in ad-hoc coordination. The Paris 
Declaration was a declaration of intent, only precise enough to elicit market confidence until it 
started to be followed up by national action plans, and whose principles were only endorsed by 
the European Council. Even the ECB recommendation on the pricing of guarantees was a purely 
ad-hoc advice by the Governing Council, without a defined legal basis. This was the triumph of 
discretion over rules.  
At implementation stage, the monitoring of national actions – whose main pranks were to be 
regarded as state aids – could rely on a provision of the Treaty stating that aids introduced to 
“remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State” can be considered 
compatible with the common market (Art 87-3(b)). This provision provided a legal support for a 
temporary weakening of state aid rule and the monitoring of aids by the European Commission 
within the framework of competition policy provisions. In the Banking Communication of 13 
October the Commission indicated that Member States would “have to show that the State aid 
measures notified to the Commission under this framework are necessary, appropriate and 
proportionate to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State” and set 
precise criteria for assessing various forms of assistance to banks. This was the revenge of rules 
over discretion.  
Coordination thus interestingly relied on a combination of a purely ad-hoc, non-legally 
grounded but politically binding plans and treaty-based monitoring by the Commission. 
There is no comprehensive evidence on the basis of which the effectiveness of this monitoring 
mechanism can be assessed. DG Competition’s self-assessment, published in August 2009
25, 
indicates that the set objectives have on the whole been met. However, it also echoes concerns 
over cross-country differences in pricing of guarantees (in spite of common principles) and 
about the fact that national support was (sometimes explicitly, but also implicitly) been made 
conditional on extending credit to domestic customers, thereby leading to Single Market 
fragmentation.  
Outside observers have also voiced concerns over the lack of sufficient recapitalisation and 
restructuring of the banking sector (see IMF, 2009b). The IMF assesses that Europe trails the US 
as regards the absorption of bank losses.  
                                                            
25 DG Competition's review of guarantee and recapitalisation schemes in the financial sector in the current crisis, 7 
August 2009.  21 
 
3.5 The treatment of pan-European banks  
As indicated in the Introduction, the absence of a framework for dealing with the possible 
failure of a cross-border institution was identified before the crisis as a major shortcoming of 
the EU architecture. Concerns were raised both about the lack of incentives to information-
sharing and the lack of provisions for ex ante burden-sharing (see for example Freixas, 2003 and 
Véron, 2007). When the crisis developed, there was no shortage of call for concerted action that 
hinted at, or explicitly called for, a European solution to the crisis of pan-European institutions 
(see Alesina et al., 2008, and Gros and Micossi, 2008).  
In the event, however, calls for ex ante burden-sharing were consistently rejected by the 
authorities and even the suggestion of a compartmented fund to which member states would 
all contribute without exercising joint responsibility fell on deaf ears. In spite of the exceptional 
severity of the crisis and the high risks involved in the failure of a large cross-border financial 
institution, governments never departed from the position that there is no European taxpayer 
and that all support to the banking sector has to be national.  
This however did not prevent the bail-out of two large institutions with significant cross-border 
operations, Fortis and Dexia. Asymmetric information, incentives to cheat and disagreements 
over burden-sharing did not prevent international cooperation on their rescue. Fortis was 
broken up along national lines, at a cost for its (private) shareholders but at no systemic cost, 
whereas Dexia was jointly rescued by three EU member states in which public entities were 
among the shareholders prior to the crisis.  
4. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to assess the management of the 2007/2008 banking crisis in the 
EU against the backdrop of pre-crisis institutional arrangements that were found clearly sub-
optimal. Three conclusions emerge from our assessment.  
First, the management of the crisis has taken place according to the assignment of competences 
that exists in the EU: the ECB and national central banks outside the euro area have acted as 
liquidity providers, national governments have dealt with financial stability, and the European 
Commission has enforced competition disciplines. Although some of these players, notably the 
ECB, have gone beyond the pre-existing script, none has gone beyond its pre-existing role. 
Especially, there has been no EU-financed bail-out of ailing transnational institutions.  
Second, coordination problems have been dealt through a combination of ad-hoc, discretionary 
cooperation and reliance on existing instruments, notably those of competition policy. 
Remarkably, the separation between the main currency zone, the euro area, and the main 
financial centre, London, has not been a major obstacle to coordination. 22 
 
Third, the better-than expected performance of the EU, so far, ought to give rise to no illusion. It 
is only because EU financial stability arrangements are so sub-optimal that a rather positive 
assessment of their functioning can be provided.        23 
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Figure 1: Comparative internationalisation of large banks 
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Figure 2: Two phases of the crisis 
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Figure 3: Public capital injections into the banking sector, Oct. 2008 to June 2009 
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Figure 4: Public guarantees on bank liabilities, Oct. 2008 to June 2009 
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Table 1: Essential features of the pre-crisis state of play 
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Table 2: State aid in the banking sector (October 2008-Aug 2009) 
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